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Abstract 
Historically, unexpected improvements in mortality rates have led to large, unanticipated increases in life 
expectancy, with accompanying increases in the value of defined benefit pension liabilities. As a result, 
longevity risk needs to be measured and managed alongside the financial risks facing these plans. The 
emergence of new instruments for hedging longevity risk means that a complete toolkit is now available 
for managing these plans in a way that is sustainable over the long term. Decisions to hedge or eliminate 
longevity risk need to be made in a holistic framework. For corporate pension plans this means taking 
account of the corporate finance perspective, as well as the interdependencies between the sponsor and 
the plan. This paper addresses the importance of measuring and managing longevity risk and presents a 
holistic framework for sustainable pension plan management that facilitates longevity risk management 
decision-making. 
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Chapter 6
Longevity Risk Management, Corporate 
Finance, and Sustainable Pensions
Guy Coughlan
Longevity risk poses a significant threat to the provision of  retirement income. With 
life expectancy having steadily risen in most of  the world’s countries, so too has the 
cost of  providing adequate income in retirement. Moreover, the fact that actuaries 
and demographers have consistently underestimated these increases in life expec-
tancy is a cause for concern and calls into question the sustainability of  defined 
benefit (DB) pension plans and the adequacy of  individual retirement savings.1
Until recently, longevity risk was an unacknowledged risk in DB pension plans, 
despite being an obvious risk for individuals who financed their retirement directly 
from savings. Just how big longevity risk actually is depends on the details of  each 
pension plan: in particular, the precise nature of  its benefits and the demographic 
profile of  its members (or beneficiaries). For most DB pension plans, longevity risk 
has generally been smaller than both the investment risk associated with the pen-
sion assets and the interest rate risk associated with the pension liability. Yet for 
pension plans that have substantially de-risked and/or have a low funded status, 
longevity risk can emerge as much more significant.
The development of  new tools to measure and manage longevity risk means 
that DB pension plans now have at their disposal a complete toolkit for ensuring 
the plan is managed in a sustainable fashion. But simply having the tools available is 
not enough. To make sustainability a real possibility requires not only appropriate 
implementation, but also, for many plan sponsors, a change in mindset. In particu-
lar, it means taking a perspective which has a greater focus on the financial econom-
ics of  the plan and a reduced focus on the accounting. For corporate pension plans, 
this means also taking account of  the principles of  corporate finance and the inter-
relationships between the pension plan and the sponsor.
This chapter emphasizes the importance of  addressing longevity risk in DB pen-
sion plans and presents a framework for the sustainable management of  these plans 
based on these observations. Our framework provides a basis for long-term man-
agement of  the plan, in a way that minimizes the likelihood that the sponsor will be 
required to make an excessively large unplanned contribution at some future date, 
and also maximizes the likelihood that plan members will receive their full pension 
benefits.
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In what follows, we address the notion of  sustainability for DB pension plans 
and what it means for pension management. We then discuss the size of  longevity 
risk and its significance for DB plans. Subsequently we review the development 
of  the longevity market and the new instruments for managing longevity risk that 
make sustainability a realistic goal. The corporate finance context of  pensions is 
then presented as the appropriate stage for addressing longevity risk management 
decisions. Our discussion emphasizes the importance of  understanding the differ-
ing, but interrelated, perspectives of  the sponsor and the plan. Finally, we present a 
framework for sustainable management of  DB pension plans, which incorporates 
decisions related to management of  longevity risk.
Long-term Alternatives for DB Plans
Over the long term, there are only two possible strategic alternatives for the spon-
sor of  a DB pension plan: transfer it or keep it. The decision to transfer it, now or 
at some time in the future, means executing a pension buyout, or termination, with 
an insurance company. This is the traditional approach to managing longevity risk 
and it involves selling the longevity risk along with all other risks and transferring 
pension obligations to the insurer, thereby removing the pension from the sponsor’s 
balance sheet. In contrast, a decision to keep the pension plan entails a commit-
ment to maintain it for the long term. This involves managing the longevity risk 
(along with all other risks) over the life of  the plan.
In both cases, the management of  the pension assets against the pension liability 
requires a focus on the underlying economics of  the plan, rather than the account-
ing. When the objective is a buyout/termination, the insurer will certainly take 
this long-term economic perspective. So moving from an accounting focus to an 
economic focus soon becomes prudent. When the objective is to keep the plan over 
the long term, this necessitates a long-term perspective on performance and risk, 
along with a long-term commitment to manage the plan sustainably. Since it is the 
economics that matters over the long term, an economic perspective is also vital in 
this case.
Managing DB Pension Plans Sustainably
Insurance companies in the business of  providing life annuities and pension buy-
outs are practical examples of  the kind of  sustainable management relevant to DB 
pension plans. These insurers, in fact, make a profitable business out of  manag-
ing what are effectively (at least in economic terms) DB pension plans. They do so 
by fully (or indeed over-) funding the liability, hedging unrewarded and unwanted 
risks, and managing a carefully designed, diversified investment strategy. Moreover, 
they do so within the tightly controlled regime of  insurance regulation, which 
effectively places limits on the minimal level of  funding, the risk profile, and the 
 Longevity Risk Management 91
investment strategy. It is partly because of  these restrictions that the annuity busi-
ness has remained profitable and sustainable.
Clearly DB pension plans are different from annuity portfolios and cannot be 
managed in exactly the same way. In particular, unlike annuity portfolios, they may 
be underfunded and are associated with a sponsor for whom managing pensions 
is not the main business line. Nevertheless, the insurance example provides practi-
cal pointers as to what pension plans and their sponsors can do to make them more 
sustainable.
Sustainability for DB pension plans means being able to manage the plans for 
the long term, without (a) exposing the sponsors to the potential requirement of  
making excessively large contributions at some future date and (b) exposing plan 
members to increased risk that the sponsors are unable to pay pension benefits in 
full. In practice, sustainability can only be achieved by ensuring two things. The 
first is that a credible and sustainable strategy is in place for funding the pension 
plan through contributions. The second is that the risks facing the plan are appro-
priately sized and diversified, relative to the plan’s funded status and relative to the 
size, risk profile, and financial strength of  the sponsor. These require a thorough 
understanding of  both the perspective of  the pension plan and the perspective of  
the sponsor, which reflects the interdependencies between them in the context of  
corporate finance. This is a point on which we elaborate further on in the chapter.
How Significant is Longevity Risk for  
DB Pension Plans?
As mentioned, the significance of  longevity risk for a DB pension plan depends on 
the details of  the plan:: specifically, the nature of  its benefits and the demographic 
profile of  its members. Some key factors determining the size of  this risk are listed 
Table 6.1 Factors that impact the longevity risk in a DB pension plan
Category Factor
Demographic Number of  members
Age profile 
Gender profile
Socioeconomic profile
Aggregate health profile 
Profile of  spouses and dependents
Willingness of  members to take lump sums (if  available)
Utilization of  other optional benefits
Benefit structure Fixed benefits vs. inflation- or COLA-linked benefits
Nature of  lump sum options
Nature of  spouse and dependent benefits
Nature of  other optional benefits and payment adjustments
Source: Author’s tabulation.
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in Table 6.1. The principal demographic factors relate to the age and socioeco-
nomic profiles of  the members, whereas the factors relating to benefit structure 
include whether the benefit payments are fixed or rise in line with inflation, or some 
other cost of  living adjustment (COLA). If  a plan has an inflation- or COLA-linked 
benefit structure, the longevity risk is significantly magnified. Another benefit 
structure-related factor is the nature of  lump sum options. If  a plan permits mem-
bers to take a lump sum payment in lieu of  a pension at an attractive conversion 
price, then longevity risk will be diminished by an amount that depends on the 
take-up rate.
Relative to the financial risks faced by most DB pension plans, longevity risk is 
usually smaller. For most U.S. and U.K. plans, their traditional high allocation to 
growth assets (principally equities) has meant that longevity risk has generally been 
smaller than investment risk. Additionally, longevity risk has been typically smaller 
than the interest rate risk associated with the pension liability. Despite this, longev-
ity risk can emerge as much more significant in relative terms if  the plan has low 
funded status, has substantially de-risked by reducing its equity allocation, and/or 
has hedged a significant amount of  its liability interest rate risk.
Unfortunately, the significance of  longevity risk must be measured in detail for 
each pension plan. This involves a two-stage process, where the first stage involves 
evaluating the likelihood and size of  potential increases in life expectancy for the 
plan members/beneficiaries. The second stage involves evaluating how these 
potential future increases in life expectancy impact the pension liability. The result-
ing longevity risk depends on the factors related to the demographics and benefit 
structure, as listed in Table 6.1.
Stage 1: Projecting Future Mortality
Life expectancy is estimated by measuring current mortality rates and forecasting 
future rates, taking account of  how the observed historical trend of  falling mortal-
ity rates—referred to as mortality ‘improvements’—is likely to evolve in the future. 
So the first stage in evaluating longevity risk requires quantifying the potential 
range of  outcomes for the trend of  future mortality improvements, relative to the 
initial (or base) mortality table.
Typically, actuaries develop longevity forecasts based on extrapolative methods 
that project future mortality from historical trends (Lee and Carter 1992; Currie 
et al. 2004; Cairns et al. 2006).2 These are complex models that are widely used 
for valuation and risk assessment of  pension plans and insurers’ annuity portfolios.
So historical mortality improvements provide a useful input into how mortality 
rates might evolve in the future. Figure 6.1 shows average annualized mortality 
improvements for U.S. males in five-year age groups over the 41-year period 1968–
2008.3 These average improvements range from 0.96 percent per annum (p.a.) for 
ages 25–29 to 1.92 percent p.a. for ages 60–64. Note that a mortality improvement 
of  0.96 percent p.a. means that next year’s mortality rate will be 99.04 percent of  
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this year’s mortality rate, then the following year’s mortality rate will be 99.04 per-
cent of  the next year’s rate, etc.
It is important to note that the average improvements in Figure 6.1 obscure con-
siderable variation over time. This is illustrated in Figure 6.2, which shows annu-
alized five-year mortality improvements for ages 70–74.4 The average mortality 
improvement for this age group is 1.74 percent p.a., but over the period it shows 
an upward trend rising from 0.70 percent p.a. to 2.44 percent p.a. with significant 
volatility.
For comparison, Figure 6.1 also shows the Scale BB forecast improvements pub-
lished by the Society of  Actuaries (2012) for use in pension valuations. The Scale 
BB improvements are generally below the historical averages, except for ages 75 
and over, but even for these higher ages the Scale BB improvements are signifi-
cantly below the most recent five-year improvements.
If  we take an aggregate view of  five-year mortality improvements across all age 
groups and all years collectively, then the average improvement comes to 1.43 per-
cent p.a. with a standard deviation of  1.51 percent and a 95 percent confidence 
‘worst case’ improvement of  3.38 percent p.a. Figure 6.3 shows a histogram of  
all these mortality improvements, which illustrates the degree of  volatility in the 
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historical observations. Note the absolute worst case is an improvement of  8.55 per-
cent p.a., which occurred for ages 30–34 over the period 1995–2000.
Stage 2: Impact on the Pension Liability
The second stage in the evaluation of  longevity risk involves measuring the impact 
of  projected mortality improvements on the pension liability. This can be evaluated 
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either in terms of  a stochastic value-at-risk (VaR) metric or in terms of  a sensitivity 
metric similar to interest rate duration called mortality duration, or ‘q-duration’ 
(Coughlan et al. 2007a).
Mortality q-duration is defined as the percentage increase in the value of  a pen-
sion liability if  mortality improvements are higher (and mortality rates correspond-
ingly lower) than expected by 1 percent per year compounded (Coughlan et al. 
2008a). Table 6.2 compares the mortality q-duration and interest rate duration for 
generic U.S. pension benefits without lump sums for 45-year-old and 65-year-old 
U.S. males. Note that q-duration, although much smaller than interest rate dura-
tion, is still significant. This is partly due to the mortality improvement expectations 
for these individuals and partly due to the current interest rate environment, in 
which nominal interest rates are very low and real rates are negative at all but the 
longest maturities.5 Table 6.2 shows that if  mortality improvements are underesti-
mated by 1 percent p.a. then a fixed pension liability (with no inflation or COLA 
linkage) increases by 15 percent for 45-year-olds and by 5 percent for 65-year-olds. 
For an inflation- or COLA-linked liability the increases are 22 percent and 8 per-
cent respectively. Note that the longevity risk and interest rate risk are both higher 
for younger plan members than for older members, reflecting the longer duration 
(q-duration and interest rate duration) of  pensions for the former.
Longevity, Interest Rate, and Inflation Risks
Longevity risk, interest rate risk, and inflation risk are the key risks to which DB 
pension liabilities are subject,6 but the relationship between them is often over-
looked. For example, despite the fact that mortality rates and interest rates appear 
to be uncorrelated, longevity risk and interest rate risk are actually interdepend-
ent. When interest rates fall, longevity risk increases, and when life expectancy 
increases, interest rate risk increases. Moreover, the impact of  a combined change 
Table 6.2 Mortality q-duration and interest rate duration for generic U.S. pension benefits 
without a lump-sum option
45-year-old
pre-retirement
65-year-old
retiree (pensioner)
Initial life expectancy 37.1 years 19.2 years
Impact on life expectancy of  an unexpected mortality 
improvement of  1% p.a.
+3.9 years +1.4 years
q-duration for a fixed pension* 16 5
q-duration for an inflation- or COLA-linked pension* 22 8
Interest rate duration for a fixed pension** 36 11
Interest rate duration for an inflation- or COLA-linked 
pension**
39 13
Notes:
* % increase in pension value due to a 1% p.a. unexpected improvement in mortality rates
** % increase in pension value due to a 1% fall in interest rates
Source: Author’s calculations.
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in interest rates and longevity is greater than the sum of  the parts. In other words, 
the impact of  a combined fall in interest rates and an increase in mortality improve-
ments is actually greater than the sum of  the impacts of  these changes separately. 
This compounding effect can be seen clearly in Figure 6.4. The same is true of  the 
combination of  longevity risk and inflation risk.
The obvious implication of  this interrelationship is that longevity risk and inter-
est rate risk (and inflation risk where appropriate) should be measured and man-
aged together in a coordinated fashion. Moreover, the advent of  longevity swaps 
now makes it practical to coordinate the hedging of  longevity risk and interest rate 
risk of  pension liabilities. This brings a new dimension to so-called liability-driven 
investing (LDI) strategies and to other strategies that are liability ‘aware.’
The Significance of Longevity Risk
Such analysis shows that longevity risk can be very significant for many DB pen-
sion plans, depending on their benefit structure and demographics. It can lead to 
higher benefit payments than expected over a longer period of  time than expected, 
thereby increasing the value of  the pension liability. This can have a devastating 
impact on the funded status of  the plan over the medium term—even if  the invest-
ment and risk management strategies are best in class.
Ignoring longevity risk means that pension plans cannot be credibly managed 
for the long term. It also means that pension buyouts/terminations will appear rel-
atively more expensive. For these reasons, longevity risk needs to be incorporated 
into both the process of  measuring risk and the strategy for managing risk.
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Figure 6.4 Impact of  an interest rate stress and mortality improvement stress on the value 
of  the pension liability (fixed benefit payments) for 45-year-olds.
Source: Author’s calculations.
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Evolution of Longevity Risk Management
The development of  new tools such as longevity swaps has made longevity risk 
management viable for DB pension plans. Before the development of  such tools, 
the management of  longevity risk was rigidly tied to both funding and the manage-
ment of  other pension-related risks. In particular, instruments for removing lon-
gevity risk also removed other risks and, moreover, required that the pension be 
funded at least to the level of  the risk mitigation. In this section, we briefly review 
the evolution of  longevity risk management from traditional annuities to the flex-
ible, new capital markets solutions. The different types of  longevity risk manage-
ment solutions are summarized in Table 6.3.
Longevity risk management essentially began as an insurance activity. This 
involves individuals and DB pension plans buying annuities from insurers, in order 
to provide certainty of  retirement income regardless of  how long people live. The 
annuity insurers then invest the proceeds from selling annuities and manage the 
Table 6.3 Summary of  longevity risk management solutions that have been transacted
Solution Type of  
contract
Risks transferred or 
hedged
Comments
Buyout or 
termination
Insurance Longevity risk and all 
other financial and 
demographic risks
Removes pension plan from the 
sponsor’s balance sheet
Buy-in Insurance Longevity risk and all 
other financial and 
demographic risks
Annuities become pension plan 
assets and the plan remains on the 
sponsor’s balance sheet
Lump sum offer Agreement 
between 
sponsor and 
beneficiaries
Longevity risk and all 
other risks
Removes pension plan from the 
sponsor’s balance sheet
Longevity swap Capital 
markets or 
insurance
Longevity risk only Exchanges actual pension benefit 
payments (based on realized 
longevity) for a fixed set of  
payments
q-forward Capital 
markets
Longevity risk only Exchanges a payment based on a 
realized mortality rate for a fixed 
payment
Synthetic buy-in Capital 
markets or 
insurance
Longevity risk and 
selected other 
financial risks
Combines longevity swaps with 
hedges of  financial risks (e.g. 
interest rate swaps) in a flexible 
way. May also include asset swaps
Out-of-
the-money 
longevity 
swap
Capital 
markets or 
insurance
A portion of  the 
longevity risk. 
Specifically just 
that associated with 
large increases in life 
expectancy
Does not hedge increases in life 
expectancy that are below a 
certain level
Source: Author’s tabulation.
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assets (i.e. investments) against these liabilities (i.e. annuities). Since annuities are of  
very long duration, insurers manage these portfolios using a carefully constructed 
long-term investment and risk management program.
Pension Buyouts, Buy-ins, and Terminations
The traditional solution for managing the longevity risk in a DB pension plan is 
to transfer the liability, along with all its risks, to an insurer via a contract of  insur-
ance. This type of  transaction is called a pension buyout, or pension termination. 
A buyout is one endgame for a DB pension plan, in that it removes the pension 
liability from the plan sponsor’s balance sheet. This process involves transferring 
the pension assets and liabilities to an insurer, together with a top-up payment. 
This payment is required to bring the assets up to the level of  the so-called ‘buy-
out liability,’ which is typically larger than the size of  the liability recorded in the 
accounts. This liability is larger because it generally reflects more realistic lon-
gevity assumptions, market-based risk-free discount rates, expenses, and a risk 
premium.
A related type of  solution is a pension buy-in, which, in contrast to a buyout, does 
not remove the pension liability from the sponsor’s balance sheet. It involves the bulk 
purchase of  annuities by the pension plan to match the obligations and risks associ-
ated with a subset of  the plan’s liabilities, typically associated with retired members. 
In a buy-in, the annuities become assets of  the plan and reflect the exact mortality 
and demographic characteristics of  the plan’s beneficiaries. Buy-ins are often used 
as stepping stones to a buyout. They effectively reduce the size of  the pension plan in 
economic terms, but not necessarily in accounting or regulatory terms. Their utility 
lies in their ability to enable the plan to move towards a buyout gradually over time, 
allowing the sponsor to avoid the large upfront payment that is required in a buyout 
(at least for plans that are underfunded on this basis) and also allowing the sponsor to 
take advantage of  periods in which annuity pricing is favorable.
Note that as a result of  innovation, actual transactions have recently become 
more complex and in many cases cannot be accurately characterized as a simple 
buyout or buy-in.
The modern longevity market, of  which buyouts and buy-ins are a part, effec-
tively began in 2006 in the U.K. with the launch of  several new monoline insurers 
set up specifically to acquire DB pension plans.7 Prior to this time, the buyout mar-
ket in the U.K., like that in the U.S. and elsewhere, comprised pension plans that 
were being wound up, often due to the insolvency of  the sponsor. This proto-market 
was characterized by a large number of  small buyout transactions typically totaling 
£1.5–2 billion a year in the U.K., and similar levels in the U.S. and Canada.
Crucially for the development of  the market, the new specialist insurers were 
backed by investment banks and private equity, which brought a new mindset and 
helped crystallize innovation within the market. This has led to the creation of  new 
capital market-based solutions, as well as new insurance-based solutions.
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New Solutions for Longevity Risk
Shortly after the birth of  the longevity market, capital markets-based solutions for 
managing longevity risk began to emerge. These solutions were motivated by a 
perceived need for additional capacity for bearing longevity risk; greater diversity 
of  counterparties; liquidity and flexibility; fungibility; and better management of  
counterparty credit risk.
Longevity Bonds
One of  the earliest proposals for a capital markets-based longevity hedging instru-
ment was the so-called longevity bond (Blake and Burrows 2001; Blake et al. 2006), 
which predated the birth of  the longevity market. A longevity bond (or survivor 
bond) is essentially a life annuity bond with no return of  principal, whose payments 
decline in line with the survivorship profile of  a population of  individuals. If  the 
individuals in the population live longer than expected, then the bond makes cor-
respondingly larger payments than expected.
The first attempt to issue a longevity bond to manage the longevity risk of  DB 
pension plans took place in 2004, when the European Investment Bank (EIB) 
sought to launch a 25-year, £540 million longevity bond with an initial coupon of  
£50 million (Azzopardi 2005). The reference population for calculating survivor-
ship was all 65-year-old males from the national population of  England and Wales 
as reflected in mortality statistics produced by the U.K. Government Actuary’s 
Department. The structurer and lead manager for the bond was the French bank 
BNP Paribas, which intended to assume the longevity risk and then reinsure it 
through PartnerRe. Unfortunately, the bond was unsuccessful for several reasons 
connected with its structure and the lack of  education of  its target market (Blake 
et al. 2006).
Then in 2006, the World Bank, with the help of  the Chilean insurance regu-
lator, the Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros (SVS), made another attempt 
to issue a longevity bond, but this time in Chile (Zelenko 2011). The bond was 
targeted at insurers who provide retirement annuities and the SVS agreed to pro-
vide explicit regulatory capital relief  to insurers who hedged the risk. A feasibility 
project was conducted with BNP Paribas, but the effort foundered due to the high 
cost of  what was envisaged to be a World Bank-issued longevity bond. Following 
this, the World Bank turned to J.P. Morgan to develop a more cost-effective 
25-year maturity bond structure that was designed to provide an effective hedge, 
with minimal basis risk. The longevity bond was to be issued out of  a collateral-
ized special purpose entity, with Munich Re taking the longevity risk and J.P. 
Morgan managing the cash flow mismatch between the various payment streams 
(Coughlan 2009; Life & Pension Risk 2010). This bond, like others before it, was 
not successful for reasons related to its novelty and what was perceived to be little 
need to hedge.
100 Recreating Sustainable Retirement
The First Successful Capital Markets Solutions
In 2007, a very different capital markets instrument for transferring longevity risk, 
called a ‘q-forward,’ was proposed (Coughlan et al. 2007b). This instrument was a 
mortality forward-rate contract, a financial derivative that locks in a fixed mortality 
rate at a future time. Its name comes from the actuarial symbol for a mortality rate, ‘q.’
A q-forward is an agreement in which two parties agree to exchange an amount 
proportional to the actual, realized mortality rate of  a given population, in return 
for an amount proportional to a fixed mortality rate at a future date (the maturity 
of  the contract). The importance of  q-forwards derives from the fact that they are 
building-blocks from which other, more complex, instruments can be constructed. 
When appropriately designed, a portfolio of  q-forwards can be used to hedge 
the longevity exposure of  an annuity or a pension liability with a high degree of  
effectiveness.
The first successful capital markets transaction to hedge longevity risk was in fact 
a q-forward contract. It was executed by Lucida PLC, a pension buyout insurer, 
in January 2008 (Lucida 2008; Symmons 2008). The instrument was a q-forward 
linked to a longevity index based on England and Wales national male mortality for 
a range of  different ages.8 The hedge was provided by J.P. Morgan, and was novel 
not just because it involved a longevity index and a new kind of  product, but also 
because it was designed as a hedge of  liability value rather than a hedge of  liability 
cash flow. In other words, it hedged the value of  the annuity, not the actual annuity 
payments.
Soon afterwards, in July 2008, J.P. Morgan completed another capital 
market-based longevity hedge, this time with Canada Life in the U.K. (Trading 
Risk 2008; Life and Pension Risk 2008). But in this case, the hedging instrument 
was different from that used by Lucida. It was a 40-year maturity £500 million 
longevity swap linked not to an index, but to the actual mortality experience of  
the 125,000-plus annuitants in Canada Life’s annuity portfolio. It also differed in 
being a cash flow hedge of  longevity risk by hedging the variability in pension ben-
efit cash flows rather than just the variability in the value of  the liability. And most 
significantly, this transaction brought capital markets investors into the longevity 
market for the very first time, as the longevity risk was passed from Canada Life to 
J.P. Morgan and then directly on to investors. The Canada Life–J.P. Morgan lon-
gevity swap has become a standard instrument for transferring longevity risk. Such 
a longevity swap involves the exchange on a regular basis of  the actual realized 
annuity, or pension benefit, payments for a fixed set of  payments based on fixed life 
expectancy.
The third capital markets longevity swap to be completed was a hybrid of  
the first two, involving a hedge of  both cash flow and value provided by RBS to 
U.K. insurer Aviva in March 2009. It was a £475 million hedge based on the actual 
mortality experience of  Aviva’s annuitants. The longevity risk in this transaction 
was also placed with a group of  capital markets investors (Towers Perrin 2009; 
Trading Risk 2010).
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June 2009 saw the execution of  the first longevity swap implemented by a pen-
sion plan. Babcock International implemented a series of  customized longevity 
swaps totaling £1.2 billion to hedge the longevity risk in its three U.K. pension 
plans. These were capital markets swaps transacted with Credit Suisse. Although 
the structure of  the swap was not new, being essentially the same as that of  the 
Canada Life–J.P. Morgan swap, it was significant in that it demonstrated the practi-
cal relevance of  longevity swaps for managing longevity risk in DB pension plans.
New Insurance Solutions
At the same time, product innovation was also occurring in insurance-based solu-
tions. An example of  this was the ‘synthetic pension buy-in,’ the first of  which was 
transacted in July 2009 by the pension plan of  RSA Insurance Group. This was 
essentially an asset-swap-funded longevity swap executed in insurance format with 
Rothesay Life, which also incorporated hedges of  inflation risk and interest rate risk. 
An important component in this £1.9 billion transaction was a total return swap—
of  U.K.  government securities (gilts) for higher-yielding government-backed 
bonds—whose cash flows were used to fund the longevity swap. The key to this 
synthetic buy-in was the effective combination of  insurance and capital markets 
capabilities across Rothesay Life and its parent, Goldman Sachs (Tsentas 2011). 
Also in 2009, the first public sector pension plan transacted a longevity swap in 
the U.K. The Royal County of  Berkshire Pension Fund entered a £750 million 
insurance-based longevity swap with Swiss Re to hedge a portion of  its longevity 
risk.
Initiatives to Facilitate Market Development
In addition to the developments described which were designed to facilitate indi-
vidual transactions, there were also a number of  initiatives broadly aimed at facili-
tating the development of  the longevity market as a whole. Here we mention the 
most significant.
The first of  these was LifeMetrics (Coughlan et  al. 2007a, 2007c, 2008b), 
launched by J.P. Morgan in association with the Pensions Institute and Towers 
Watson in 2007, with the aim of  promoting standardization and education. 
LifeMetrics was from its launch a publicly available set of  resources for measuring 
and managing longevity risk that included a risk management framework, longev-
ity indices (for the U.S., England and Wales, Germany, and the Netherlands), ana-
lytics, and software. The framework blended actuarial and financial perspectives 
on longevity, in order to educate and establish a common basis for longevity risk 
management across the insurance, pension, banking, and investment management 
industries.
Then in November 2008, Hymans Robertson, a pension consultant, launched 
an organization to enable U.K. pension plans to pool mortality data in return for 
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regular analysis and reporting on longevity (Hymans Robertson 2008). Called 
Club Vita, it aimed to provide pension plans with better and timelier information 
on longevity trends. By 2011, Club Vita had amassed a huge longevity database 
with more than 130 large pension plans contributing data, including the U.K.’s 
Pension Protection Fund (PPF).9
Another facilitating initiative was the formation in 2010 of  a not-for-profit, 
cross-industry trade association called the Life & Longevity Markets Association 
(LLMA). The LLMA aims to ‘promote a liquid, traded market in longevity and 
mortality-related risk’ by supporting the development of  ‘consistent stand-
ards, methodologies and benchmarks.’10 In April 2011, the LLMA acquired the 
LifeMetrics Longevity Index from J.P. Morgan.
Developments in the U.S. Market
The U.K.  initiated the development of  the longevity market, but progress has 
also been made recently in other countries, notably the U.S., Canada, and the 
Netherlands. The U.S., in particular, has seen several important transactions since 
2011. For example, in May 2011, U.S. insurer Prudential announced a high-profile 
$75  million buy-in for the pension plan of  Hickory Springs Manufacturing 
Company. Then 2012 saw several significant transactions, including very large 
deals by General Motors and Verizon. We return to these in the next section.
Pension Risk Management and  
Corporate Finance
Next we describe the corporate finance context of  DB pension plans, which pro-
vides the backdrop for the management of  longevity risk and also has important 
implications for the sustainable management of  these plans.
In 2012, four major U.S.  corporations announced significant initiatives to 
address the challenges associated with their U.S. pension plans. Each of  these was 
very different from the other. The first took place in April, when Ford announced 
it was offering lump sum payments to some 90,000 retirees (pensioners) and ter-
minated vested (i.e. deferred) plan members as part of  a long-term de-risking 
strategy. This offering effectively transferred the longevity risk, investment risk, 
and all other pension-related risks to the individual members. This was followed 
by General Motors’ (GM) announcement in June of  its intention to remove $29 
billion of  pension liability from its balance sheet, with a combination of  (a) retiree 
lump sums, (b) a spin-off of  active and terminated vested members into a new GM 
pension plan, and (c) the termination of  the residual retiree plan. This combina-
tion transferred the longevity risk to external parties, including retirees and an 
insurance company (Prudential). Then in October, Verizon announced the buyout 
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(with accounting settlement) of  $7.5 billion of  pension liabilities. The same month, 
AT&T announced a plan to contribute $9.5 billion of  preferred stock in its wireless 
business into its pension plans. This last transaction was a pension funding transac-
tion without an annuity purchase or a lump sum offering.
The diversity of  these transactions is striking, reflecting as it does the varied 
circumstances and objectives of  the sponsors and their associated pension plans. 
This diversity also emphasizes the importance of  understanding the situations 
and perspectives of  both the sponsor and the pension plan when evaluating risk 
management and funding. It is particularly important to note the interrelation-
ships between them. For corporate pension plans, these interrelationships need to 
be understood in the context of  corporate finance.
The literature addressing DB pensions in the context of  corporate finance goes 
back several decades (e.g. Tepper and Afflect 1974; Sharpe 1976; Treynor 1977; 
Black 1980; Tepper 1981). However, those papers involved simple models used 
to illustrate the principles. It was not until the 2000s that these ideas began to be 
widely promoted, and researchers and investment banks began to develop practi-
cal methods to incorporate them into decision-making (Coughlan and Ong 2003; 
Bodie 2004; Jurin and Margrabe 2005; Frieman et al. 2005; Jin et al. 2006).
Impact of the Pension Plan on the Sponsor
The relevant corporate finance implications of  DB pension plans relate to their 
impact on the firm’s (a) capital structure, (b) risk profile, and (c) enterprise value. In 
particular, we note the following.
A DB pension liability is a form of  debt, which is held by the plan members 
and collateralized by pension assets (Feldstein and Morck 1983; Bodie 2004). In 
fact, investors view pension deficits, or underfunding, as being like debt, but riskier 
(Long et al. 2010). As a result, an underfunded pension has an impact on the credit 
rating of  the firm as it is effectively a claim against the future operating cash flows of  
the business, which reduces the security of  other debtholders. Carroll and Niehaus 
(1998) established empirically that debt market valuations actually do reflect the 
funded status of  the plan.
The funded status of  a DB pension plan is also reflected in equity market valua-
tions of  the sponsor, as established by a number of  empirical studies (Feldstein and 
Seligman 1981; Feldstein and Morck 1983; Bodie et al. 1987; Bulow et al. 1987; 
Bodie and Papke 1992; Long et al. 2010).
Pension risk adds volatility to the sponsor’s stock price, increases the equity beta 
of  the firm, and raises the weighted average cost of  capital or WACC. Moreover, a 
pension plan typically decreases the firm’s optimal leverage ratio and reduces debt 
capacity (Frieman et al. 2005; Jin et al. 2006; Gold 2008; Long et al. 2010).
Pension risk adds to the overall risk profile of  the corporation, consuming risk 
budget and displacing business opportunities that might have otherwise been pur-
sued. If  the risk of  the pension is too great, then it can impact liquidity and/or 
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financial strength, leading to reduced access to the capital markets and threatening 
the execution of  business plans (Coughlan and Ong 2003; Frieman et al. 2005; 
Gold 2008).
These points demonstrate that a DB pension plan can have a significant impact 
on the value of  a firm’s debt and equity through both the plan’s funding level and 
its risk profile. In particular, Long et al. (2010) present an empirical analysis that 
suggests that the sponsor’s stock price is inversely related to the size of  the pen-
sion liability and directly related to its funded status. Moreover, it appears that 
the impact of  funded status on debt and equity prices is asymmetric. Jurin and 
Margrabe (2005) developed a theoretical model for this based on the option-like 
profile created by the U.S. excise tax on the reversion of  pension surpluses. See also 
Coronado et al. (2008).
Impact of the Sponsor on the Pension Plan
Conversely, a firm’s capital structure decisions, corporate risk profile, and financial 
strength have an impact on the fair value of  the claims of  pension plan members. 
The members of  an underfunded plan rely on the sponsor to make contributions to 
eliminate the deficit and ensure all pensions are paid in full at some future time. The 
sponsor’s ability to do so depends on these factors and is summarized in its credit 
rating. Note that even if  plan members’ claims are collateralized by a fully funded 
asset portfolio, this may only be temporary because of  a risky asset allocation or a 
liability that is growing faster than asset returns. In other words, the plan members 
hold a contingent call on the firm’s future cash flows even if  the plan is currently 
fully funded. As a result, the capital structure, corporate risk profile, and financial 
strength of  the sponsor should be of  great interest to plan members and fiduciaries.
Both Perspectives Matter: Sponsor and Plan
While a DB pension plan must always be managed in the best interest of  its mem-
bers, the previous discussion suggests that the management of  any such plan 
should take into account the perspectives of  both the sponsor and the plan itself. 
Furthermore, despite the existence of  some conflicts, we argue that the relationship 
between the two is in many ways symbiotic: what is good for the plan is often good 
for the sponsor, and vice versa. In considering these two perspectives, the interre-
lationships between sponsor and plan necessitate a holistic approach to evaluating 
pension decisions. This has a long history, and it involves consolidating the pension 
plan and the sponsor into each other’s economic balance sheet (see Treynor et al. 
1978). It was originally referred to as the ‘augmented balance sheet,’ but we shall 
use the term ‘holistic balance sheet.’
From the sponsor’s perspective, the pension plan should be consolidated into the 
corporate balance sheet and evaluated using the principles of  corporate finance, 
with the aim of  maximizing shareholder, or firm, value. We call this consolidation 
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the holistic corporate balance sheet. Pensions need to be economically consolidated along 
with the rest of  the corporation despite the fact that the company is not the legal 
owner of  the assets in the pension fund, because it does effectively own the risks 
and rewards associated with those assets. In particular, if  the assets outperform, the 
company’s contributions into the pension fund will fall. On the other hand, if  the 
assets underperform, then contributions will need to rise. For this reason, pensions 
must be economically consolidated for the purposes of  risk management and the 
management of  capital structure.
Conversely, from the plan’s perspective, the sponsor should be consolidated into 
the pension balance sheet using the principles of  financial economics, with the aim 
of  maximizing the probability that pension plan members (beneficiaries) receive 
the full benefits they have been promised. We call this consolidation the holistic pen-
sion balance sheet. An important component on the asset side of  this holistic balance 
sheet is the so-called ‘sponsor covenant,’ which reflects the ability and willingness 
of  the sponsor to fund the plan and ensure that pensions are paid in full. All under-
funded plans rely on the sponsor covenant, the value of  which reflects the credit 
rating of  the sponsor, the level and timing of  planned contributions, and the associ-
ated risks. Also included on the asset side are other contingent assets such as benefit 
guarantees from bodies such as the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) 
in the U.S. and the PPF in the U.K. These organizations make payments in the 
event that the assets fall short of  what is needed for a specified guaranteed ben-
efit level. Recently, the European Insurance and Occupational Pension Authority 
(EIOPA) has been discussing the notion of  a holistic balance sheet for pension plans 
as the basis of  future European pension regulation. This version of  the holistic bal-
ance sheet also includes contingent assets, such as benefit guarantees and the spon-
sor covenant (European Commission 2012).
The holistic balance sheet concept, as applied to both the sponsor and the pen-
sion plan, neatly summarizes the interdependencies between these two entities and 
provides an objective basis for evaluating strategies for sustainable management of  
the plan. This concept is fundamentally based on a purely economic view of  pen-
sions, rather than the more traditional accounting view.
Managing Longevity Risk in Pension Plans
With the advent of  longevity swaps and the other new solutions for longevity risk 
management described earlier in the chapter, pension longevity risk can now be 
managed in a flexible and customized way, similar to the way in which other pen-
sion risks are managed. This is an important element of  ensuring the sustainability 
of  a DB pension plan over the long term. Prior to the development of  these new 
instruments, longevity risk could only be fully hedged with annuities in the form of  
a buyout or a buy-in, which required all risks to be hedged at the same time and was 
not possible unless the plan was adequately funded.
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As we have argued, corporate finance provides the appropriate context for man-
aging longevity risk and developing sustainable DB pension strategies. As such, it 
provides important insights into the economics of  pension decisions from the per-
spectives of  the key stakeholders: the plan beneficiaries and the corporate sponsor.
Framework for Sustainability
Now that all the tools are available to manage pension plans sustainably, what is 
required is a framework for evaluating the key decisions such as whether to transfer 
or keep the pension plan; how much longevity risk to hedge (this is relevant if  the 
plan is being kept, or if  a buyout is planned at a distant time in the future); and the 
degree to which funding and the management of  other risks should be pursued in 
conjunction with longevity risk management.
The framework we propose acknowledges the interrelationships between the 
pension plan and the sponsor, and the connections with corporate finance dis-
cussed earlier. In particular, from the sponsor’s perspective, the relevant decision 
metrics are linked to valuation in terms of  shareholder value and/or enterprise 
value. This will be driven by the impact of  the pension plan on the corporate cost 
of  capital, corporate risk profile, and competing uses of  cash flow. On the other 
hand, from the pension plan’s perspective the relevant decision metrics are linked 
to the valuation of  the sponsor covenant. This will be driven by the impact of  the 
pension plan on corporate credit quality, corporate risk profile, and cash flow.
Several tools are important in implementing this framework. Foremost among 
these are the holistic balance sheets of  both the sponsor and the pension plan, as 
illustrated in Figure 6.5. These capture the economic impact of  contingent assets 
and liabilities, a realistic measurement of  the pension liability, and the interde-
pendencies between the sponsor and the plan. Note the contingent liability on 
the sponsor’s balance sheet, which incorporates additional claims on the sponsor, 
including the additional liability that would result if  the funded status falls below 
its current level, as well as the excise tax that would accrue should the plan become 
significantly overfunded.
Also important are the risk profiles, or risk decompositions, of  both the sponsor 
and the pension plan. Table 6.4 summarizes the main financial and demographic 
risks in the risk profile of  a typical DB pension plan.
The framework can be summarized as follows. First, evaluate the pension liabil-
ity in economic terms. This includes the use of  market interest rates for discount-
ing liability cash flows, up-to-date mortality base tables, and realistic projections 
for future mortality improvements. Second, model the interdependencies between 
the pension plan and the sponsor, and their differing perspectives. This includes 
taking account of  the optionality in the holistic balance sheet of  each. Important 
metrics include materiality of  the plan as measured by the ratio of  economic pen-
sion liability to equity market capitalization (or enterprise value) and the ratio of  
economic pension deficit to the market value of  corporate debt. Third, evaluate 
Sponsor Perspective
Holistic Corporate Balance Sheet 
Pension Plan Perspective
Holistic Pension Plan Balance Sheet

Assets Liabilities
Economic decit Pension liability
Contingent assets
Sponsor covenant 
Financial assets
Assets Liabilities
Operating assets Debt
Equity
Pension related
contingent claims 
Pension liability
Pension assets
Figure 6.5. The holistic balance sheets for the sponsor and the pension plan reflect the 
economic interdependencies between them.
Note: Illustrative only, not to scale.
Source: Pacific Global Advisors.
Table 6.4 Major financial and demographic risks impacting  
DB pension plans
Risk origin Risk type
Asset-related risk Equity risk
Interest rate risk
Nominal interest rate risk
Real interest rate risk
Includes inflation risk
Credit risk
Alternatives risk
Contingent asset-related risk Sponsor covenant risk
Benefit guarantee risk
Credit risk
Regulatory risk
Liability-related risk Interest rate risk
Nominal interest rate risk
Real interest rate risk
Includes inflation risk
Demographic risk
Longevity risk
Other
Source: Author’s tabulation.
108 Recreating Sustainable Retirement
the risk profile for the plan and the sponsor. This refers to the size and composi-
tion of  risks. For the sponsor, it includes the scale of  pension risk in relation to the 
sponsor’s operating and financing risks. For the plan, this includes the impact of  the 
sponsor covenant. Fourth, evaluate the key valuation metrics for the plan and the 
sponsor. This includes the actual and contingent impact of  the pension plan on cost 
of  capital, risk profile, credit rating, debt capacity, and cash flow. From these the 
implications can be assessed for shareholder value, enterprise value, and the value 
of  the sponsor covenant. Finally, select the preferred strategy on the basis of  how 
it impacts the pension plan and the sponsor in terms of  higher valuation metrics, 
sustainable risk levels, and diversification.
This framework provides a basis for managing the pension plan for the long 
term, which minimizes the likelihood that the sponsor will be required to make an 
excessively large unplanned contribution and maximizes the likelihood that plan 
members receive their full pension benefits. In particular, it facilitates a consistent 
approach to evaluating decisions connected with the hedging and management 
of  longevity risk, along with liability-related interest rate risk and investment risks.
Conclusion
Longevity risk can be a significant risk for many DB pension plans and should, at 
the very least, be measured along with the other risks facing these plans. With the 
development of  longevity swaps and other solutions, this risk can now be hedged in 
a flexible and customized way. As a result, DB pension plans now have at their dis-
posal a complete toolkit for ensuring they are managed in a sustainable fashion. In 
fact, because of  the compounding effects between longevity and interest rate risks, 
it is highly desirable to manage these two liability risks in concert.
We have argued that longevity risk management should be addressed in a frame-
work for managing DB plans based on corporate finance and financial economics. 
Our proposed framework acknowledges the different, but interrelated, perspec-
tives of  the sponsor and the plan, and it argues that both must be taken into account 
for optimal decision-making. Even fiduciaries acting in the interest of  the plan 
members/beneficiaries must take account of  the sponsor’s perspective in order to 
maximize the probability that pensions will be paid in full. This framework pro-
vides the basis for addressing key pension risk management decisions, including 
whether to consider a buyout/termination or pursue the hedging of  longevity risk 
as part of  the long-term management of  the plan.
Disclaimer
Information herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable but Pacific 
Global Advisors does not warrant its completeness or accuracy. Opinions and 
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estimates constitute the judgment of  the authors and are subject to change without 
notice. Past performance is not indicative of  future results. This material is pro-
vided for informational purposes only and is not intended as a recommendation or 
an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of  any security or financial instru-
ment and should not serve as a primary basis for investment decisions.
Notes
 1. See IMF (2012). The authors point out that mortality tables used by U.S. pension actuar-
ies in particular have been consistently out of  date.
 2. Recently new models have emerged based on modelling the causes of  mortality 
improvement that provide greater insight into forecasting future mortality rates (Coburn 
and Nakada 2012).
 3. These mortality improvements are derived from LifeMetrics data for U.S. males, which 
are available at www.lifemetrics.com.
 4. The data in Figures 6.2 and 6.3 reflect rolling five-year mortality improvements that are 
annualized.
 5. The mortality assumptions for this example include expected mortality improvements 
averaging 1 percent per year. At the time of  writing, nominal swap rates are close to 
2 percent at the ten-year point and 3 percent at the 30-year point, and with inflation 
expectations of  2.5 percent, real rates are negative to slightly positive across the yield 
curve.
 6. Inflation risk can be considered an interest rate risk.
 7. These specialist pension insurers included Paternoster, Synesis, Lucida, Pension 
Insurance Corporation and Rothesay Life.
 8. The mortality rates used in this first q-forward transaction were based on the LifeMetrics 
Index for the mortality of  the population of  males in England and Wales (Coughlan 
et al. 2007a).
 9. The PPF plays a similar role to the PBGC in the U.S. It was established by the U.K. 
Pensions Act 2004 to provide compensation to DB plan members, when the employer 
suffers an insolvency event and there are insufficient assets in the plan to cover the PPF 
level of  benefits.
 10. Taken from the LLMA website, <www.llma.org>.
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